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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This case involves a claim for damages for personal injuries by Plaintiff ("Robinson") 
against Defendant Connie Mueller ("Mueller"), as Personal Representative of the Estate of Hazel 
Marquardt. Robinson was injured on September 6,2009, when she fell from a second story deck 
on a house owned by Hazel Marquardt ("Marquardt") and rented by Marquardt's tenant, Bryan 
Winkelman ("Winkelman"), who is not a party to this action. The deck did not have a protective 
railing on its front and sides. Marquardt passed away in the spring of 20 11. 
B. Course of Proceedings Below 
Robinson filed her complaint against Marquardt on May 13, 2011. R. pp. 7-10. 
Marquardt answered, R. pp. 11-16, and the parties engaged in discovery, hired expert witnesses, 
took depositions of various individuals, and prepared for trial. Marquardt filed a summary 
judgment motion to which Robinson responded. R. pp. 17-94. The motion was heard on 
January 18,2013. The district court issued its Memorandum Opinion and Order Re: Motion for 
Summary Judgment on February 6, 2013. R. pp. 95-102. Judgment was entered on February 12, 
2013. R. pp. 103-04. Robinson filed a timely Notice of Appeal on March 26,2013. R. pp. 105-
108. 
C. Statement of Facts 
Hazel Marquardt and her husband purchased a house at 12 Cottonwood Drive in St. 
Maries, Idaho, in 1973. R. p. 34. The house has an upper floor apartment with a separate 
entrance. R. p. 36. The upper floor apartment has a door that opens onto a flat area bordered on 
1 
two sides by the sloped roof. R. p. 20. The flat area has been referred to in this litigation as part 
of the roof (R. p. 79), a deck, (R. pp. 41, 79), a recessed dormer (R. p. 20), a balcony (R. p. 8), 
and, in the rental agreement, a patio (R. p. 78). It will be refelTed in this brief as a deck. The 
deck did not have a protective railing surrounding it, despite the fact that it was ten to twelve feet 
above the ground. R. p. 21. The outdoor deck area is about seventy-eight square feet, and is 11.5 
feet (or 138 inches) wide and 7.56 feet (or 90.75 inches) deep. R. p. 37. The following are 
photographs of the Marquardt home from the outside, depicting the upper floor apartment and 
the deck without a railing, and the door leading from the apartment to the deck: l 
1 See proposed Augmented Record (motion submitted August 15, 20l3). 
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Beginning April 1, 2007, Marquardt rented the upstairs apartment to Bryan Winkelman. 
Marquardt lived in the downstairs portion of the horne. R. pp. 35, 78. The rental agreement did 
not require Winkelman to maintain or repair the premises. R. p. 78. Mueller testified that during 
Winkelman's tenancy in October 2008, Marquardt replaced the apartment door that led to the 
deck because the old door leaked cold air. R. p. 70. Mueller also testified that Marquardt 
replaced the carpet in the upstairs apartment. R. p. 36. 
Early in the morning on September 6, 2009, Robinson was a guest of Winkelman at the 
apartment he rented from Marquardt. Once inside the apartment, Winkelman and Robinson 
stepped onto the deck so that Winkelman could show Robinson the beautiful view from the deck. 
R. p. 39. After going back inside, Winkelman went to his car to retrieve an item and Robinson 
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picked up her cigarettes and proceeded to the deck to smoke. R. p. 40. She picked up a blanket 
from a chair as the night was cool, and walked through the door to the deck. R. p. 40. 
As she was walking through the door, she tripped. Robinson believes she tripped on the 
blanket, although she is not certain. Id. She twisted herself as she fell to the right because she 
wanted to sit to stop her fall. She knew the roof was right there and she tried to grasp onto 
something to stop her fall. Id. Robinson is certain that she tripped. She landed on the sloped 
roof and slid off the roof to the ground below, causing a fracture of her femur. R. p. 68; see also 
R. p. 8. Railing around the deck likely would have prevented her fall, either by providing her 
with something to grab onto, or by arresting the momentum of her fall. 
Robinson did not notice the lack of railings around the deck when she and Winkelman 
stepped onto the deck to look at the view. R. p. 67,68. Marquardt did not warn Robinson about 
the lack of railings around the deck, as the first time Robinson spoke with Marquardt was several 
months following Robinson's fall. R. p. 69. There were no signs warning that the deck lacked 
protective railings. R. p. 97. 
Robinson contends that Winkelman did not tell her that the deck lacked a railing. R. p. 
69. In a statement given to Marquardt's agent shortly after Robinson's fall, Winkelman said he 
did not warn Robinson about the lack of a railing and did not tell her to stay off the deck. R. p. 
79. In an affidavit he signed two and one-half years later, he said that he did warn her about the 
lack of a railing. R. p. 41-44. 
Winkelman's deposition testimony was inconsistent: 
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R. p. 72. 
R.p.74. 
Q. [By Mr. Haman) Now, you mention that you told Twylla not to go out on 
the balcony because there wasn't any deck railing. Why did you tell her 
that? 
A. Because I didn't want her to fall off. That's why I opened the door, but I 
told her - I said there was no deck railing around there. I didn't want her 
to walk out and actually not know that it wasn't there. And she would fall 
off. So I just warned her before I went down to go get my gum in my car. 
Q. [By Ms. Meyer] Do you recall giving a statement to a man named Barry 
Trent on October 6, 2009? 
A. Yes, I do. I believe I did, yeah. 
Q. Did you understand that the statement was recorded? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Have you ever seen a transcript of the statement? 
A. No. 
Q. At the time you gave the statement was it your intent to give truthful 
answers to the questions that you were asked? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you answer truthfully? 
A. As best as possible, yes. 
Q. . .. Mr. Trent apparently asked you "Did you tell Twylla or warn her 
about the deck not having any rails or anything ofthat nature?" 
And you answered that "No." Correct? 
A. Yeah. At that time I think, yes. 
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R. p. 75. 
R.p.75. 
R.p.76. 
Q. And then he also asked you "Did you tell her not to go out there?" 
And you indicated that you did not tell her not to go out there, right? 
A. Probably not at that time, no. 
Q. So-
A. Where I said - Yeah. I just - I told her - well, said, you know, it's just the 
door that - "This door opens, goes out onto the roof." 
Q. But you didn't say "Don't go out there," correct? 
A. Not that I can remember. 
Q. [By Mr. Haman] And as you sit here today your memory is that you told 
her not to go out onto that deck, correct? 
A. Yes. I may not have told him when I had an interview with him; but if I 
remember right, I thought I told her that. But I probably didn't mention 
that to him at that time. 
Q. "Him" being Mr. Trent? 
A. Yes. 
Q. [By Ms. Meyer] I asked you earlier, Bryan, if your intent when you talked 
with [Mr. Trent] was to tell the truth. And that was your intent, wasn't it? 
A. It was my intent. 
Q. And your answers were truthful when you gave them, weren't they? 
A. At the time, yes, that I can remember; yes. 
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Mr. Winkelman's recorded statement was taken on October 6, 2009, by Barry Trent, 
shortly after the fall and nearly three years before Mr. Winkelman's deposition was taken. R. p. 
74. Winkelman responded to Mr. Trent's questions about whether Winkelman warned Robinson 
as follows: 
R. p. 79. 
Q. Did you tell Twyla [sic] or warn her about the deck not having any rails or 
anything of that nature? 
A. No. Um-
Q. Did you tell her not to-
A. 1-1-
Q. Go out there? 
A. Well, 1 didn't tell her to go - not to go out there-
Q. Okay. 
A. 1 just - 1 just - 1 told her well - well, 1 said, you know, it's just - the - the 
door - or this door opens up just goes up on a roof. And - and urn, but 1 
didn't say don't go out there, you know-
II. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Did the district court err as a matter of law in failing to recognize that this Court's 
ruling in Stephens v. Stearns states the duty of a landlord to exercise reasonable care under the 
circumstances with respect to the landlord's tenant and the tenant's social guests? 
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2. Did the district court err as a matter of law in failing to extend the ruling in Stephens 
v. Stearns that a landlord's duty to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances runs to the 
landlord's tenant's guests? 
3. Did the district court err in failing to consider Marquardt's general duty to exercise 
reasonable care under the circumstances and whether that duty was an additional basis for 
liability or a basis for extending a previously defined duty? 
4. Did the district court err in holding that Marquardt did not breach a duty of care to 
Robinson and implicitly that Marquardt did not have a duty of care to Robinson? 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Supreme Court's review of a district court's ruling on a summary judgment motion is 
the same standard as that employed by the district court in ruling on the motion. Pursuant to 
Rule 56( c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, the district court must review the "pleadings, 
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits" to determine whether there are 
any genuine issues as to any material facts and whether the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law. LR.C.P. 56(c). On review, the Supreme Court liberally construes 
the record in favor of the party opposing summary judgment and resolves all reasonable 
inferences and conclusions in the non-moving party's favor. If reasonable people could reach 
differing conclusions or conflicting inferences, the motion should be denied. If the evidence 
reveals no genuine issues of material fact, the Supreme Court exercises free review over any 
remaining questions oflaw. Turpen v. Granieri, 133 Idaho 244,246-47, 985 P.2d 669, 671-72 
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(1999) (citing Friel v. Boise City Hous. Auth., 126 Idaho 484, 887 P.2d 29 (1994), Farm Credit 
Bank of Spokane v. Stevenson, 125 Idaho 270,869 P.2d 1365 (1994». 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The Landlord's Duty to Tenants and Guests of Tenants is to Exercise Reasonable Care 
Under the Circumstances. 
1. Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 678 P.2d 41 (1984), Provides the Applicable 
Duty of Care of the Landlord to a Tenant's Guest. 
Robinson was a guest of Winkelman at his second story apartment he rented from 
Marquardt who owned the residence and lived on the lower floor. Winkelman's apartment had a 
door that opened onto a deck of seventy-eight square feet. R. p. 37. The deck did not have a 
protective railing around it, and when Robinson tripped going out the door onto the deck, she fell 
to ground after sliding off the sloped roof surrounding the deck. There is no genuine issue that a 
protective railing would have arrested or prevented her fall from the second story. This case thus 
concerns injuries to a tenant's guest at a residential rental unit, and accordingly, a legal analysis 
of the landlord's (Marquardt's) duty to Robinson begins with Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 
249, 678 P.2d 41 (1984). In Stephens, this Court brought to an end the old common law rule of 
landlord immunity which provided that a landlord is generally not liable, with certain exceptions, 
for injuries caused by defects or dangerous conditions in leased premises. Stephens, 106 Idaho at 
257,678 P.2d at 49; Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388,390,308 A.2d 528, 530 (1973). 
Stephens had rented a two-level townhouse from Steams. The apartment had an interior 
stairway without a handrail. One evening more than three years after she began ren~ing the town 
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house, Stephens had drinks with friends, and when she returned to her apartment, she changed 
her clothes upstairs. She then fell dovv'l1 the stairs and was injured. Stephens sued the architect, 
builder and seller of the building, and her landlord. The trial court granted a motion for directed 
verdict in the landlord's favor, concluding that under the common law, landlords were not liable 
to tenants for damage resulting from dangerous conditions existing at the time the unit was 
leased. 106 Idaho at 257, 678 P.2d at 49. The Supreme Court noted the several exceptions to 
the general rule of non-liability, then stated that the Plaintiff had brought to the Court's attention 
the modem trend in landlord liability law across the United States that "landlords are simply 
under a duty to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances." Id 
The Idaho Supreme Court observed that the Tennessee Supreme Court had the foresight 
to "grasp this concept" nearly a century earlier when it stated: 
"The ground of liability upon the part of a landlord when he demises dangerous 
property has nothing special to do with the relation of the landlord and tenant. It 
is the ordinary case of liability for personal misfeasance, which runs through all 
the relations of individuals to each other." 
Stephens, 106 Idaho at 257, 678 P.2d at 49 (quoting Wilcox v. Hines, 100 Tenn. 538, 46 S.W. 
297,299 (1898) (emphasis added)). The "ordinary case of liability for personal misfeasance" 
will be discussed further in section B of this brief. 
This Court also relied on Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d 528 (1973), the 
seminal case advancing the "modem trend" that landlords must exercise reasonable care under 
the circumstances. This Court quoted the following passage from Sargent: 
"We thus bring up to date the other half of landlord-tenant law. Henceforth, 
landlords as other persons must exercise reasonable care not to subject others to 
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an unreasonable risk of harm . . . . A landlord must act as a reasonable person 
under all of the circumstances including the likelihood of injury to others, the 
probable seriousness of such injuries, and the burden of reducing or avoiding the 
risk." 
Stephens, 106 Idaho at 258, 678 P.2d at 50 (quoting Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d 
528,534 (1973)). Significantly, the injury in Sargent was not to a tenant but to a child the tenant 
was tending. This is important. Stephens involved an injury to a tenant, but many of the cases 
from other jurisdictions relied on by the Idaho Supreme Court involved injuries to tenants' 
guests, visitors, and to the tenants themselves. 
Discussing the control exception to the landlord non-liability rule, the North Hampshire 
court observed: 
The anomaly of the general rule of landlord tort immunity and the 
inflexibility of the standard exceptions, such as the control exception, is pointedly 
demonstrated by this case. A child is killed by a dangerous condition of the 
premises. [Tenants] testify that they could do nothing to remedy the defect 
because they did not own the house nor have authority to alter the defect. But the 
landlord claims that she should not be liable because the stairs were not under her 
control. Both of these contentions are premised on the theory that the other party 
should be responsible. So the orthodox analysis would leave us with neither 
landlord nor tenant responsible for dangerous conditions on the premises. This 
would be both illogical and intolerable, particularly since neither party then would 
have a legal reason to remedy or take precautionary measures with respect to 
dangerous conditions. In fact, the traditional 'control' rule actually discourages a 
landlord from remedying a dangerous condition since his repairs may be evidence 
of his control. Nor can there be serious doubt that ordinarily the landlord is best 
able to remedy dangerous conditions, particularly where a substantial alteration 
is required. 
113 N.H. at 393-94,308 A.2d at 532 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
The Sargent court said that although the dangerous stairs at issue were not a common 
stairway or otherwise under the landlord's control, it could nevertheless "strain" to find control 
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in the landlord. However, the court was not inclined to so "expand the fiction" "since we agree 
that 'it is not part of the general law of negligence to exonerate a defendant simply because the 
condition attributable to his negligence has passed beyond his control before it causes injury. '" 
113 N.H. at 393, 308 A. 2d at 531. The court noted that its decision would shift the primary 
focus from the usual inquiries concerning who had control to a determination of whether the 
landlord and the injured party exercised due care under all the circumstances. 
Perhaps even more significantly, the ordinary negligence standard would help 
insure that a landlord will take whatever precautions are necessary under the 
circumstances to reduce the likelihood of injuries from defects in his property. "It 
is appropriate that the landlord who will retain ownership of the premises and any 
permanent improvements should bear the cost of repairs necessary to make the 
premises safe [.]" 
113 N.H. at 399, 308 A. 2d at 535 (quoting Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87,92,276 A.2d 248,251 
(1971)). 
Likewise, this Court in Stephens v. Stearns noted that many courts "'have expended 
considerable energy and exercised great ingenuity in attempting to fit various factual settings 
into the recognized exceptions'" to the rule oflandlord non-liability. 106 Idaho at 258,678 P.2d 
at 50 (citations omitted). 
Id. 
We believe that the energies of the courts of Idaho should be used in a more 
productive manner. Therefore, after examining both the common-law rule and 
the modem trend, we today decide to leave the common-law rule and its 
exceptions behind, and we adopt the rule that a landlord is under a duty to 
exercise reasonable care in light of all the circumstances. 
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In announcing this rule, the Court allayed fears that landlords would face unfettered 
liability: "We stress that adoption of this rule is not tantamount to making the landlord an 
insurer for all injury occurring on the premises, but merely constitutes our removal of the 
landlord's common-law cloak of immunity." Id 
In Stephens, this Court relied on many cases from other jurisdictions including Young v. 
Garwacki, 380 Mass. 162, 402 N.E. 2d 1045 (1980), and Pagelsdorf v. Safeco Ins. Co. of 
America, 91 Wis. 2d 734, 284 N.W. 2d 55 (1979). Stephens, 106 Idaho at 258,678 P.2d at 50. 
The facts in the Young case are remarkably similar to the facts in the present case. 
Garwacki was a tenant of LaFreniere. Garwacki's roommate, Mastello, invited Young to 
Garwacki's and Mastello's second floor apartment for a dinner party. Mastello went down to his 
car which was parked near the house. Young went to the elevated front "porch," which was 
accessible only from the living room of the second story apartment, to ask Mastello to pick up 
some groceries. When she placed her hands on the railing and leaned forward, the railing gave 
way, she fell to the ground, and was injured. Young, 380 Mass. at 163, 402 N.E. 2d at 1046. 
Relying on Sargent v. Ross, among other authority, the court held: 
Today, we do away with the ancient law that bars a tenant's guest from 
recovering compensation from a landlord for injuries caused by negligent 
maintenance of areas rented to the tenant. Like the other rules based on status, 
this rule has prevented a whole class of people from raising the overriding issue: 
whether the landlord acted reasonably under the circumstances. The practical 
result of this archaic rule has been to discourage repairs of rented premises. In 
cases like the one before us, a landlord with knowledge of a defect has less 
incentive to repair it. And the tenant, who often has a short-term lease, limited 
funds, and limited experience dealing with such defects, will not be inclined to 
pay for expensive work on a place he will soon be leaving. Thus, the defect may 
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go umepaired until an unsuspecting plaintiff finds herself with a lawsuit that care 
could have prevented. 
380 Mass. at 168-69,402 N.E. 2d at 1049. 
The facts in Pagelsdorf v. Saftco Ins. Co. of America, are also similar to the facts in this 
case. In Pagelsdorf, the Blattners rented a second story duplex from the Mahnkes, who lived in 
the lower unit. There were front and back balconies on each unit. A neighbor, Pagelsdorf, went 
to the Blattners' apartment to help move some heavy furniture. In the process of hoisting some 
furniture over the rear balcony railing to the ground, Pagelsdorf leaned against the railing which 
came loose. He fell to the ground below, and was injured. 91 Wis. 2d at 735, 284 N.W. 2d at 
56. 
The Wisconsin court noted that the facts of the case arose prior to the Supreme Court's 
decision in Antoniewicz v. Reszczynski, 70 Wis. 2d 836, 236 N.W. 2d 1 (1975), in which the 
distinctions between different duties owed by a possessor of land to a licensee or invitee were 
abolished. The parties agreed that the extent of Mahnke's duty to Pagelsdorf turned on whether 
Pagelsdorf was an invitee or licensee. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin disagreed, however, 
noting that the arguments overlooked "the effect on a landowner's common law duty upon 
transfer of the premises from the owner to a lessee." Under the common law, when property was 
leased, the landlord was not liable for injuries to his tenants or their guests resulting from defects 
in the premises, unless certain exceptions applied, none of which were applicable to the facts of 
the case. Pagelsdorf, 91 Wis. 2d at 739-41, 284 N.W. 2d at 558-59. 
The court stated: 
14 
Therefore, if we were to follow the traditional rule, Pagelsdorf was not entitled to 
an instruction that Mahnke owed him a duty of ordinary care. We believe, 
however, that the better public policy lies in the abandonment of the general rule 
of nonliability and the adoption of a rule that a landlord is under a duty to exercise 
ordinary care in the maintenance of the premises. 
Id. at 741,284 N.W. 2d at 59. 
Relying on Sargent v. Ross, the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated the following 
concerning the old rule of landlord nonliability: "Whatever justification the rule might once have 
had, there no longer seemed to be any reason to except landlords from a general duty of 
exercising or<;linary care to prevent foreseeable harm." Pagelsdorf, 91 Wis. 2d at 742, 284 N.W. 
2d at 59. The court then held: 
In Antoniewicz, supra, we cited Sargent as one of many cases whose reasoning 
supported the abolition of the common law distinctions between licensees and 
invitees. The policies supporting our decision to abandon these distinctions 
concerning a land occupier's duty toward his visitors compel us, in the instant 
case, to abrogate the landlord's general cloak of immunity toward his tenants and 
their visitors. Having recognized that modem social conditions no longer support 
special exceptions for land occupiers, it is but a short step to hold that there is no 
remaining basis for a general rule of nonliability for landlords. .,. One of the 
basic principles of our tort law is that one is liable for injuries resulting from 
conduct foreseeably creating an unreasonable risk to others. Public policy 
limitations on the application of this principle are shrinking. 
Id. at 743, 284 N.W. 2d at 59-60 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
Important principles can be derived from the foregoing. First, the old landlord immunity 
was comprehensive. Once a landlord demised the premises to a tenant, the landlord had no 
liability to the tenant or the tenant's guests for defects in or dangerous conditions on the 
premises. Pagelsdorf, 91 Wis. 2d at 740, 284 N.W. 2d at 58; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 
356, comment a (1965) (cited by Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho at 257,678 P.2d at 49). This is 
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because a lease was generally considered a conveyance of real property with possession and 
control being transferred to the lessee as well. Pagelsdorf, 91 Wis. 2d at 740, 284 N.W. 2d at 58. 
"This 'quasi-sovereignty of the landowner,'" including immunity from "simple rules of 
reasonable conduct which govern other persons" "find its source in an agrarian England of the 
dark ages." Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. at 391, 308 A. 2d at 530 (citations omitted). 
Second, this Court's elimination of the old rule of landlord non-liability was 
comprehensive as well: "[W]e today decide to leave the common-law rule and its exceptions 
behind, and we adopt the rule that a landlord is under a duty to exercise reasonable care in light 
of all the circumstances." Stephens, 106 Idaho at 258, 678 P.2d at 50. Although Stephens v. 
Steams involved an injury to a tenant, there is nothing in the court's ruling or holding expressly 
limiting it to tenants. 
Indeed, this Court's reliance on cases involving injuries to guests such as Sargent, Young, 
and Pagelsdorf, combined with the very language quoted and employed by this Court in 
Stephens lead to the inescapable conclusion that the ruling is not confined only to tenants, but to 
tenants' guests as well: "'A landlord must act as a reasonable person under all of the 
circumstances including the likelihood of injury to others, the probable seriousness of such 
injuries, and the burden of reducing or avoiding the risk.'" Id. (quoting Sargent v. Ross, 113 
N.H. 388,308 A.2d 528,534 (1973)). 
Third, because this is a case involving residential rental premises, the entrants-on-the-
land status of licensee and invitee do not apply based on the holding in Stephens v. Stearns. The 
concurring opinion in Marcher v. Butler, 113 Idaho 867, 749 P.2d 486 (1988), confirms this. In 
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that case, a residential tenant's cleaning lady fell down stairs that were narrow and lacked a 
handrail. The Court held that because an employee will encounter a known and obvious danger 
to retain employment, the landlord owed the tenant's employee a duty of reasonable care to 
provide safe conditions. Id. at 871, 749 P.2d at 490. The concurring opinion provides special 
insight into the Court's earlier opinion in Stephens: 
In Stephens v. Stearns, supra, we held that the measure of a landlord's 
duty is not determined under trespasser-licensee-invitee analysis, but rather, "A 
landlord must act as a reasonable person under all of the circumstances including 
the likelihood of injury to others, the probable seriousness of such injuries, and 
the burden of reducing or avoiding the risk." Id., at 258, 678 P .2d at 50, quoting 
Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.S. 388, 308 A.2d 528, 534 (1973). The landlord's duty to 
exercise reasonable care in light of all the circumstances extends to his or her 
tenant or anyone on the premises with the tenant's consent. Pagelsdorf v. Safeco 
Ins. Co. of America, 91 Wis.2d 734, 284 N.W.2d 55,61 (1973). 
Marcher, 113 Idaho at 872, 749 P.2d at 491 (Bistline and Huntley, J1., concurring) (emphasis 
added). 
The Court in Harrison v. Taylor, 115 Idaho 588, 768 P.2d 1321 (1989), also discussed 
Stephens v. Stearns and the Marcher concurrence. In Harrison, this Court noted that "likelihood 
of injury to others" is the equivalent of foreseeability and quoted the concurring opinion in 
Marcher v. Butler referenced above: 
In Marcher v. Butler, supra, two concurring justices recognized the applicability 
of the Stephens rule and stated the following: 
The trial court's reliance upon the traditional law pertaining to 
invitees was misplaced. The test is one of reasonableness under all 
the circumstances, not one of hidden or obvious dangers, or 
exceptions to the traditional general rule of non-liability for 
landlords. As we have said before, there is no justification for the 
general cloak of common law immunity for landlords. 
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Id. at 593-94, 768 P.2d at 1326-27 (quoting Marcher v. Butler, 113 Idaho at 872, 749 P.2d at 491 
(Bistline and Huntley, JJ., concurring». 
Plaintiff contends that Marquardt's actions in maintaining the upper floor apartment at 12 
Cottonwood Drive without a protective railing around the flat deck area violated her duties of 
reasonable care to Robinson. In other words she did not '''act as a reasonable person under all of 
the circumstances including the likelihood of injury to others, the probable seriousness of such 
injuries, and the burden of reducing or avoiding the risk. '" Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho at 
258,678 P.2d at 50, (quoting Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d 528, 534 (1973)). When 
a second story apartment has a deck accessed by an interior door and the deck is not protected by 
a railing, the likelihood of injury to others is increased, and not only that; injury is foreseeable. 
The probable seriousness of injuries to those who fall more than ten feet to the ground below is 
high, and the burden of reducing or avoiding the risk is relatively small. In addition, a tenant of a 
residential rental unit is generally not in a position to remedy the dangerous condition because he 
may not be authorized to undertake repairing or altering the premises, Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 
at 393-94, 308 A.2d at 532, and he "often has a short-term lease, limited funds, and limited 
experience dealing with such defects" and thus "will not be inclined to pay for expensive work 
on a place he will soon be leaving." Young v. Garwacki, 380 Mass. at 168-69, 402 N.E. 2d at 
1049. 
Although Stephens v. Stearns established that the landlord's common-law cloak of 
immunity was abolished, Defendant maintains that Stephens applies only to a landlord's duty to 
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its tenants. As between the landlord and a tenant's guests, Defendant contends that the landlord 
is to be considered a mere owner of land and the entrants-on-the-Iand paradigm applies. That 
would mean that liability of the landlord for injuries to the tenant is analyzed under a completely 
different legal theory than the liability of the landlord for injuries to the tenant's guest. The facts 
of this case illustrate the absurd results that would follow: If the tenant, Winkelman, had fallen 
from the deck, the issue would have been whether Marquardt had acted reasonably under all the 
circumstances in maintaining a deck without a protective railing. Yet, with respect to the 
tenant's guests, according to the Defendant, the landlord would only have a duty, if at all, to 
warn the tenant of the dangerous condition. 
Another reason this case should not be analyzed under the entrants-on-the-Iand paradigm, 
is that Marquardt leased the apartment, and she should remain in her role as a landlord, rather 
than be converted to a mere owner/occupier of land if there is an injury to her tenant's guest. 
Moreover, The Defendant and the district court are incorrect in applying the entrants-on-the-Iand 
theory in this case. If the Stephens rule does not apply to tenant's guests, Marquardt would have 
no duty to Robinson-not even a duty to warn-under the old landlord immunity law. It is 
difficult to imagine that this Court, joining the modem trend in 1984 in "leaving behind" the 
antiquated law of landlord non-liability, intended to leave social guests of tenants without even 
the ordinary negligence protection that people are owed from other people to refrain from 
conduct resulting in umeasonable, foreseeable risks of harm. 
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2. Alternatively, The Landlord's Duty of Reasonable Care Announced in Stephens 
v. Stearns Should be Extended to a Landlord's Tenant's Guests. 
If the Court determines that Stephens announced the elimination of the landlord cloak of 
immunity only with respect to tenants, Robinson urges the Court to continue in Idaho the modem 
trend in extending the landlord's duty of reasonable care under the circumstances to guests of 
tenants. There is no good reason to avoid doing this. The duty urged is an ordinary negligence 
duty of reasonable care; it is not a duty of extraordinary care or strict liability. It is the general 
duty every person has in ordering his or her conduct so as to avoid exposing others to a 
foreseeable, unreasonable risk of harm. 
B. Every Person has a General Duty to Exercise Reasonable Care. 
As a general rule "each person has a duty of care to prevent unreasonable, foreseeable 
risks of harm to others." Shmp v. WH Moore, 118 Idaho 297, 796 P.2d 506 (Idaho 1990). This 
was stated by the Court as an additional reason for finding the existence of a duty of care in 
Sharp. 
The Court stated further that "[wJhether the duty attaches is largely a question for the trier of 
fact as to the foreseeability of the risk," and that "[f]oreseeability is a flexible concept which 
varies with the circumstances of each case." Id. at 300, 796 P.2d at 509. "Where the degree of 
result or harm is great, but preventing it is not difficult, a relatively low degree of foreseeability 
is required." Id. at 300, 796 P.2d at 509-10. 
Sharp was an employee of Swan Insurance Agency which rented space in a building 
owned by W.H. Moore, Inc. W.H. Moore contracted with Security Investment to manage the 
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building and Security Investment hired Security Police to provide patrols. Id at 298, 796 P.2d at 
507. Sharp was working alone in her office on a Sunday morning when she was assaulted and 
raped by an intruder. The intruder may have gained access through a unlocked third floor fire 
escape door and into the office through the unlocked office door. Id. The defendants (W.H. 
Moore, Security Investments and Security Police) filed a summary judgment motion, which was 
granted. In reversing, this Court noted that the Court in Stephens v. Stearns determined that a 
landlord owes a tenant a duty of reasonable care. The Court continued: 
In addition to the clear rule of Stephens, other legal principles favor the 
recognition of a requirement of due care in the circumstances present here. One is 
the familiar proposition that one who voluntarily assumes a duty also assumes the 
obligation of due care in performance of that duty. . .. 
Another reason for finding a duty of care to exist in this case is the general 
rule that each person has a duty of care to prevent unreasonable, foreseeable risks 
of harm to others. Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617, 619, P.2d 135 (1980); 
Harper v. Hoffman, 95 Idaho 933, 523 P.2d 536 (1974). 
Every person has a general duty to use due or ordinary care not to 
injure others, to avoid injury to others by any agency set in 
operation by him, and to do his work, render services or use his 
property as to avoid such injury. [Citations omitted.] The degree 
of care to be exercised must be commensurate with the danger or 
hazard connected with the activity. [Citations omitted.] 
Whitt v. Jarnagin, 91 Idaho 181, 188, 418 P.2d 278, 285 (1966). Whether the 
duty attaches is largely a question for the trier of fact as to the foreseeability of the 
risk. 
Sharp v. WH Moore, 118 Idaho at 300, 796 P.2d at 509. 
The Court stated that foreseeability is a flexible concept that vanes with the 
circumstances of each case. "Where the degree of result or harm is great, but preventing it is not 
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difficult, a relatively low degree of foreseeability is required. Conversely, where the threatened 
injury is minor, but the burden of preventing such injury is high, a higher degree of foreseeability 
may be required." Id. (citing us. v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) 
(Judge Learned Hand); Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hasp., 38 Ca1.3d 112,211 Cal.Rptr. 356, 
695 P.2d 653, 658 (1985)). 
This general duty of care was also discussed at length in Boots v. Winters, 145 Idaho 389, 
179 P.3d 352 (Ct. App. 2008). In Boots, a child and his mother were bitten by a dog and they 
asserted various causes of action against the landlord including premises liability which the court 
said did not apply since the tenant's dog did not constitute a condition, but rather an activity, on 
the premises. In addition, however, the plaintiffs asserted that the landlord had a general duty to 
exercise ordinary care. In that regard, the Court of Appeals stated: 
Our Supreme Court has suggested that premises liability is not the exclusive source of 
duties where a landowner is involved. Instead, circumstances may give rise to a general 
duty of care owed to third parties. As a general principle, every person, in the conduct of 
his or her business, has a duty to exercise ordinary care to prevent unreasonable, 
foreseeable risks of harm to others. 
Id at 393, 179 P.3d at 356 (citing Sharp v. WH Moore, 118 Idaho at 300, 796 P.2d at 509 
(1990); and Turpen v. Granieri, 133 Idaho 244, 247-48, 985 P.2d 669, 672-73 (1999)). 
The Boots Court stated that in determining whether such a duty will arise in a particular 
context, the Supreme Court has identified several factors. They include foreseeability of harm to 
the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the Plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the 
connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attaching 
to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the 
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defendant and the consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with 
resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk 
involved. Boots, 147 Idaho at 394; 179 P.3d at 357 (citations omitted). The Court in Sharp 
pointed out that the harm need not be specifically foreseeable. In Sharp, the harm that was 
foreseeable if doors were left unlocked was theft of property, but the Court said that it is the 
general nature of the harm--criminal activity-that must be foreseeable, not the specific harm; 
which in that case was rape. Sharp, 118 Idaho at 301-02; 796 P.2d at 510-11. 
Analyzing the factors listed in Boots: 
• In this case where we have a second story apartment with a deck accessed from inside the 
apartment by a door, it is foreseeable that a person, particularly a guest of a tenant who is 
less familiar with the premises, may be harmed if the person falls from the deck. 
• There is no question in this case that Robinson suffered injury as a result of falling from 
the deck, and there is a close connection between Marquardt'S maintaining the deck 
without a railing and Robinson's injuries which likely would not have occurred if a 
railing had existed. 
• There is little burden to the Marquardt to install a railing around the deck, and in fact 
Marquardt had expended money installing a new door during the year prior to Robinson's 
fall. 
• There is a policy of preventing future harm and no real consequences to the community 
of finding that Marquardt violated a general duty to exercise ordinary care under the 
circumstances. We regularly encounter railings on stairs, or elevated platforms, in our 
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community. It is quite unusual for an elevated platform such as that on the Marquardt 
horne to lack protective railings. Ordinary care-indeed, cornmon sense-require a 
protective railing around such a structure. 
• In addition, insurance is widely available for homeowners including those who 
rent their premises, and in fact Marquardt maintained liability insurance on the 
premises. That is not an issue for the fact finder, of course, but it is a factor for 
the Court to consider according to the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. 
The Defendant asserted below that this general duty of reasonable care is inapplicable if a 
specific duty has already been established. There may be some support for that in Rife v. Long, 
127 Idaho 841, 908 P.2d 143 (1996), in which the Court observed: 
We only engage in a balancing of the harm in those rare situations when 
we are called upon to extend a duty beyond the scope previously imposed, or 
when a duty has not previously been recognized. 
Id at 846, 908 P.2d at 148. However, this Court was clear in Sharp that "an additional reason" 
for finding a duty of care to exist was the general rule that everyone has a duty of care to prevent 
umeasonable, foreseeable risks of harm to others. Sharp, 118 Idaho at 300, 796 P.2d at 509. 
Moreover, Robinson is asking this Court to recognize the applicability of Stephens to tenant's 
guests or to extend the landlord's duty of reasonable care under the circumstances to tenant's 
guests. 
The general duty to act reasonably under the circumstances is the principle announced by 
the Tennessee Supreme Court in Wilcox v. Hines more than a century ago, and relied on by this 
Court in Stephens v. Stearns: 
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"The ground of liability upon the part of a landlord when he demises dangerous 
property has nothing special to do with the relation of the landlord and tenant. It 
is the ordinary case of liability for personal misfeasance, which runs through all 
the relations of individuals to each other." 
Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 257, 678 P.2d 41, 49 (quoting Wilcox v. Hines, 100 Tenn. 
538,46 S.W. 297,299 (1898) (emphasis added)). 
C. The District Court Erred in Ruling that Marquardt Did Not Breach a Duty to 
Robinson. 
The district court concluded that "there was no breach of a duty owed by Marquardt to 
Robinson." It is important to note, however, that the district court did not identify a duty owed 
by Marquardt to Robinson. The district court found that it was undisputed that Marquardt did 
not warn Plaintiff about the lack of railings or place signs warning about the lack of a railing. R. 
p. 97 (factual finding no. 11). The court acknowledged an issue of fact concerning whether 
Winkelman warned Robinson, R. p. 98, but ruled that the disputed factual issue was immaterial 
to the issues presented. Marquardt claims that only the tenant would have the duty to warn, 
arguing that the tenant steps into the shoes of the landlord/owner. This argument, however, 
overstates Harrison v. Taylor, the case Defendant relies on for this proposition. 
In Harrison v. Taylor, 115 Idaho 588, 768 P.2d 1321 (1989), this Court did away with the 
open and obvious danger defense and reversed a summary judgment in favor of the business 
tenant and business owner regarding a business patron's fall on a defective sidewalk. The Court 
ruled: 
[T]here is an additional basis for reversing the ruling of the trial court 
here. Either a tenant, or a landlord, or both, may be liable to a third party for 
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injuries resulting from negligent repairs or failure to repair. Even in the absence 
of a specific lease provision, and with no controlling statute requiring him to 
make repairs, if a landlord voluntarily undertakes repairs he is bound to use 
reasonable and ordinary care or skill in the execution of the work. 49 Am.Jur.2d 
§ 795, p. 746 (see cases cited therein). Similarly, a tenant or lessee, having control 
of the premises is deemed, so far as third parties are concerned, to be the owner, 
and in case of injury to third parties occasioned by the condition or use of the 
premises, the general rule is that the tenant or lessee may be liable for failure to 
keep the premises in repair. 
In this case the testimony was conflicting regarding whether Mr. Taylor 
[owner] or the Struchens [tenant] had responsibility for maintenance of the 
sidewalk. Mr. Struchen contended that Taylor was responsible under the oral 
lease. Mr. Taylor testified that no maintenance agreement existed. Regarding 
voluntary repairs, Mr. Struchen stated that on one occasion he repaired a sidewalk 
hole different from the one Mrs. Harrison fell in. Taylor testified that there was 
no clear cut procedure for repairs and sometimes he would do them and 
sometimes Struchen would. These controverted issues of material fact, together 
with conflicting testimony over whether the sidewalk was a common area for use 
by all the business tenants of the building, demonstrate that the matter was not 
ripe for summary judgment. 
Id. at 596-97, 768 P.2d at 1329-1330 (citations and references to the record omitted) (emphasis 
added). 
In this case the Marquardt arguably had the duty to maintain and repair the premises, not 
Winkelman. Marquardt's duty to repair and maintain the premises is evidenced by her actual 
maintenance and repair: replacing the door opening onto the deck at issue during the year prior to 
Robinson's fall, and replacing the carpet in the apartment. 
The very simple and cursory Lease and Rental Agreement between Marquardt and 
Winkelman, R. p. 78, does not address who has the responsibility to maintain and repair the 
premises. Accordingly, either Marquardt has that duty as the owner of the premises, or there is a 
question of fact as to who has the duty to repair and maintain. 
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The trial erred in granting summary judgment, ruling, in essence, that Marquardt owed 
Robinson no duty of care. Instead, the court should have denied summary judgment among 
other reasons because genuine issues of material fact existed concerning who had a duty to repair 
or maintain the premises and whether the premises were repaired or maintained negligently. 
v. CONCLUSION 
The modem trend this Court joined in 1984 with Stephens v. Stearns was leaving behind 
the antiquated cloak of landlord immunity for defects or dangerous conditions in leased premises 
and holding landlords to an ordinary standard of reasonable care. Although Stephens v. Stearns 
involved an injury to a tenant, many of the cases cited to and relied on by this Court involved 
injuries to guests of tenants. Whether such guests might be classified as social guests or business 
invitees was irrelevant because the analysis focused not on the status of the guests, but on the 
nature of the landlord's duty given the elimination ofthe landlord's previous immunity. A duty 
of reasonable care under the circumstances, including the duty to prevent unreasonable, 
foreseeable risks of harm to others, makes it irrelevant whether the person injured is tenant, 
social guest, or business invitee. 
Robinson urges the Court to recognize or extend this ordinary negligence standard of care 
of landlords toward their tenants' guests. Public policy surely favors doing so as the alternative 
is what the courts in Sargent v. Ross and Young v. Garwacki cautioned against: landlord 
immunity and its exceptions result in a disincentive to repair damaged or defective conditions on 
the premises. 
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Moreover, this Court, in quoting Wilcox v. Hines, recognized that the landlord's duty is 
not based on the landlord/tenant relationship so much as on "'the ordinary case of liability for 
personal misfeasance, which runs through all the relations of individuals to each other. '" 
Stephens, 106 Idaho at 257, 678 P.2d at 49 (quoting Wilcox v. Hines, 100 Tenn. 538, 46 S.W. 
297,299 (1898). This Court recognized that a landlord must act reasonably: 
"A landlord must act as a reasonable person under all of the circumstances 
including the likelihood of injury to others, the probable seriousness of such 
injuries, and the burden of reducing or avoiding the risk." 
Stephens, 106 Idaho at 258, 678 P.2d at 50 (quoting Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d 
528,534 (1973). 
Robinson thus respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's entry of 
summary judgment in Marquardt's favor. 
Respectfully submitted this 16th day of August, 2013. 
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A. 
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